

Effectiveness of Police Security Measures in Addressing Violent Extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya

Martin Otieno Omumbo

Abstract— Purpose: The purpose of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of security measures by the police in addressing violent extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya

Methodology: The study adopted both quantitative and qualitative method through application of questionnaires and personal interviews. The targeted population was 1693 comprising of police officers, prisons officers, and religious and civil society leaders. A sample of 10% was picked from the group using simple random, snowballing and purposive sampling. The data was analyzed through thematic review of the literature gathered and descriptive frequencies, pie charts and Bar graphs using Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS). The findings were presented in a scientific report for examination.

Findings: Physical security measures were only suitable for short term preventions whereas non-physical measures provided better solutions to violent extremism. Radicalization by radical clerics was established to be the main driver to violent extremism. The authorities need the local communities in the fight against violent extremism through counter narratives and rehabilitation programs. Inadequate resources and training were major challenges to the police.

Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: The study is grounded on the Program theory by Chen (1990). The key idea of the theory is the influence of a program on the level of outcomes. The study endorsed the application of various measures against terrorism. It recommended the hardening of soft targets such as crowded public places through security guard frisks, walk through security scanners, surveillance cameras and improved access controls. The police and members of the public should partner more in control of violent extremism. The major stakeholders including but not limited to County governments, community leaders, interior ministry in charge of security, ministry of finance, the Kenya National Police Service and the National Counter Terrorism Centre to work together build police capacity to manage violent extremism.

Index Terms- effectiveness, police security measures, violent extremism

I. INTRODUCTION

Violent extremism is a more elaborate synonym for terrorism activities, it is a process. It refers to advocating, radicalizing, and engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically, religiously motivated or justified violence to further social, economic, political or religious activity (Hermens 2016). In the context of this study the end

product of violent extremism is a terrorist attack of devastating magnitude where people lose lives, and those who come out alive are harmed or maimed and property destroyed. Botha (2013) observed that Violent Extremism and radicalization are linked to Islamic extreme religious beliefs, however for the purpose of this research and to avoid bias the researcher examined both the religious aspects and other linked issues. USAID report (2013) refers to violent extremism as advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated violence to further social, economic, religious and political objectives. A study by Vidino, Pantucci, & Kohlmann, (2010) noted various violent extremist groups around the world; one of them is Al Shabaab meaning ‘the boys’ operating in Somalia and the larger East African region. According to Buluma (2013) the Al Shabaab have two objectives, the religious being to create an Islamic caliphate under the rule by the Islamic Sharia laws; and elimination of foreign influence in Somalia. Buluma identified the regions the Al Shabaab seek to cover to include Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, North-eastern Kenya, the Ogaden Region of Ethiopia and Djibouti. Buluma stated that the other political objective by the extremists is that they want the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace soldiers to depart the country.

In a USAID report (2011) document some of the factors that lead individuals to violent extremism originate from social shortcomings such as poverty, lack of employment to the youths and other community members who are offered money by the violent extremist groups to join in those activities. Violent extremism calls for very effective security measures by the state and other stakeholders. According to Jaatun et al (2009) effective security measures are those actions taken to ensure that an individual or individuals are free from threats, danger, fear, anxiety, and uncertainty against attacks, harm and destruction of their properties by criminals. In the wake of the attack on the United States’ twin towers of New York, the Pentagon, and a passenger airliner on the 11th of September 2001, the United States president George W Bush responded by initiating what he referred to as the Global war on terror (Schimid 2014). The immediate security measures they applied were to seek for allies and take military action against the Taliban terror group which was reported to offer support and safe haven for terrorists (Vidino 2015). The US military actions overseas and within their territory did not end violent extremism, in fact there has been an emergence of lone wolf attackers converting easily

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available items such as kitchen knives, motor vehicles into lethal weapons to attack the public in the western countries (Eby 2012). According to Heydmann (2015) the US government opted for alternative measures after finding out that military actions alone cannot end the vice. The US took to tackling the drivers of violent extremism which are social problems such as poverty, lack of education and misleading religious interpretations by radical preachers. To address the problem of violent extremism may require a multidisciplinary approach. According to Saucier et al (2009) soft approach in mitigating violent extremism may be aimed at the emancipation of the minds of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism, from accepting misleading interpretations of religion that teaches violence. The soft approach discourages violence and at the same time addresses other societal problems that may push individuals to join violent extremist groups. In West Africa, Nigeria has experienced an exponential rise in violent extremism over the past nine years. A majority of these attacks are attributable to Boko Haram terrorist group. In response joint Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin military pressure was established to counter the terrorists (Institute for Economics & Peace 2016). Military action can suppress but may not end the activities associated with violent extremism. In the horn of Africa region terrorists' groups have continued to mount deadly attacks with civilians in Kenya and Somalia bearing the brunt. According to Ahmed, (2017) the first terror attack in Kenya was at the OTC Bus stage in Nairobi Central business district on 1st march 1975 where three bombs exploded killing 27 people and injuring 100 others. The second terror attack was again in Nairobi on the 31st December 1980 at the Fairmont Norfolk Hotel where a bomb was detonated killing 20 people and injuring another 80. The attack was linked to Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Libya. Another devastating terror attack by the violent extremists in East Africa were executed on the 7th of August 1998, when suicide bombers detonated simultaneous bombs in US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam respectively (Ploch,2010). In the Nairobi attack 224 people were killed and over 5000 injured (Botha 2013). In Dar es Salaam 11 people were killed. Somali capital Mogadishu bore the deadliest suicide attack in its history on civilians in October 2017 where 500 civilians were killed in a market bomb truck attack (Anderson, & McKnight, 2014). Kenya and its capital Nairobi stand as the regional hub of commercial, international enterprises and UN bodies within the eastern Africa region. People from all walks of life throng Kenya for daily economic and social activities hence make it a cosmopolitan society. This has made it easy for terror groups to carry out their activities unnoticed and become a threat to the security of the country. The attacks by violent extremist groups continued to grow despite the region having established security services. The effectiveness of any measures taken by those agencies charged with dealing with violent extremism is a determining factor to preventing further attacks hence safety of a region. According to Lind, Mutahi, & Oosterom (2015) on the 28th November 2002 Al Qaeda terrorists again bombed the Paradise Kikambala hotel in Kilifi and at the same time there was an attempt to shoot down an Israeli passenger plane that had just dropped tourist

to the same hotel and was just taking off from Moi International Airport Mombasa. According to Anderson, & McKnight, (2014) Kenya sent the military across the neighboring Somalia to pursue and tame Al Shabaab terrorists who had made the habit of making insurgency into the Kenyan territory abducting tourists and killing civilians in 2011 where western tourists in Lamu County were abducted then taken to Somalia and grenade attacks in crowded places mainly in Nairobi and Mombasa cities. The extremist group has launched a series of bombings and shooting attacks believed to be retaliatory attacks because of Kenya's military intervention in Somalia. These attacks were aimed at non-Muslim population, churches, learning institutions, police stations, police officers, and government and communication installations in the major cities of Nairobi, along the coast and North Eastern region leading to loss of lives and property (Kimutai and Ouma 2014). Therefore, the security agencies several physical and non-physical security measures such as arrest and prosecution of terror suspects and intelligence led counter measures were put in place but cases of young men being lured into violent extremism still remains on the rise. Mombasa has been the hub of recruitment and radicalization of youths to Violent Extremism. According to Mwangi (2017) this activity was being carried out by leading Islamic cleric the late Sheikh Aboud Rogo from 2005 up to 2012 before he was killed by unidentified persons. The cleric spread extreme ideology to the youth at the town's Musa mosque situated in Majengo area. Several media reports indicated that radicalization in Mombasa was carried out secretly despite arrests of several of radical youths in the County (Daily Nation newspaper reports Walloga 3/3/2014, Bocha, Ahmed 12/9/2016, Cheronno 9/1/2008). This is a time bomb since the students of the process may be lethal to the public once they commence their ultimate objectives which is to carry out violent terrorist attacks on members of the public and on security apparatus. Therefore, an effective security measure by the police in conjunction with other stakeholders to prevent violent extremism is of utmost importance for the safety and future of the County and beyond. This study therefore seeks to examine how the security measures by the police addresses violent extremism in Mombasa County.

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

Despite efforts by security agencies to deal with violent extremism in Mombasa County, the problem has persisted with more and more terror attacks as well as radicalization and various terror activities being realized. Conceptually it's not clear how effective the measures have been and therefore the need to have the County secure from terror activities made it necessary to evaluate those measures. An ideal effective security measure ensures that the objectives of freedom from fear of terrorist attack, safety of lives and property are achieved. The various counter measures by the police have not effectively realized freedom from fear of terror attacks. The vice has continued to thrive within the society and the extremists continued to execute violent attacks against innocent citizens, security personnel and property hence causing a disruption of social life, tranquility and economic activities. The security operations have often been indiscriminate in nature netting both the suspects and

innocent citizens. This may have further deepened the problem by keeping the citizens away from the agencies thus denying them an opportunity to get information on the suspects. Therefore, this called for the need to establish the link between security measures by the police versus the expected outcomes and the solutions with regard to addressing violent extremism.

B. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- i. Establish the nature and causes of violent extremism in Mombasa County
- ii. Analyze the nature and effectiveness of the measures adopted by the police in curbing violent extremism in Mombasa County
- iii. Establish the approaches that can be used to improve measures used by the police to address counter violent extremism in Mombasa County
- iv. Examine the challenges the police face in addressing violent extremism in Mombasa County

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. PROGRAM THEORY

According to Chen (1990) Program theory is defined as a set of explicit or implicit assumptions by stakeholders about what action is required to solve a societal problem and why that problem will respond to this action. The purpose of the theory is not only to assess whether an intervention works or does not work, but also how and why it does so. The outcome is essential for the stakeholders to improve their existing or future programs. The key idea of the theory is the influence of the context of the program has on the results. These approaches allow evaluators to better examine the link between the intervention measures and different levels of outcomes. They may also assess whether the desired results occurred and whether those measures played a role. This study evaluated those measures taken by the police in curbing violent extremist activities in Mombasa County against the desired results which are safety and security. This theory indicates that external factors such as social, political or economic context may negatively affect the level of effectiveness of any program's ability achieve the intended results. Some of the security measures by the police may be targeting people based on specific profiles. These measures include indiscriminate security swoops in identified locations, road checks proactive arrests and interrogations and surveillance on suspected terror operatives. The mitigating measures if viewed by some members of the public as victimization against individuals and their communities, their religion and economic well-being, may slow down efforts by the security agencies to stop violent extremism as they would not be willing to provide vital information against violent extremism. The use of the theory in this study was specifically aimed at allowing the evaluator to examine the link between those measures to address violent extremism against levels of security and safety within the members of the public then advocate for the stronger

measure to be used more in curbing violent extremism in the County.

B. NATURE AND CHARACTERISTIC OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN GENERAL

In order counter violent extremism countries need to fully understand the causes and how they influence each other to create conducive environment for violent extremism to grow (Ucko,2018). Counter violent extremism programs should therefore focus on measures aimed at pre-empting radicalization through mitigating specific drivers of violent extremism. Choi, (2016) identified the causes of violent extremism to emanate from two factors; pull and push factors. The Pull Factors are those inducements that attracts potential recruit to those violent extremism groups. These could be offer for employment or source of getting income, outlet for airing their grievances, outlet for getting spiritual comfort and experiencing a sense of belonging. The Push Factors were identified as the socioeconomic and political conditions that make the individuals to be vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism groups. These include factors such as poverty, lack of education relevant education, marginalization, denial of civil and liberty rights and historical and socioeconomic injustices. This study intends establish how the counter measures can link best to the two factors to deal with violent extremism. A study by Magogo (2016) only focused on the push factors and eventually found out that unemployment and poverty were the leading causes of violent extremism in Eastleigh, Nairobi. Most studies have focused on either pull factors or push factors separately thus creating an interface between the two factors. This study filled this gap by concurrently examining both factors through effective counter measures the security agencies would apply in the fight against terrorism. According to Jones, (2017) most studies about violent extremism have been done in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and it was established that there is not a single condition that drive individuals into violent extremism. Other underlying conditions such as politics, religion, geographical location and socioeconomic diversities played varying roles in violent extremism therefore each location had different causes from others. This means that there is a dearth of knowledge about violent extremism and counter measures in the sub Saharan Africa. This study would help to fill this gap by providing some knowledge on counter violent extremism outside the MENA region. According to Onuoha & Oyewole, (2018) Boko Haram group was an uprising group in Northern Nigeria that was protesting against underdevelopment in the region in 2002. The security forces then brutally suppressed the uprising by killing hundreds of its members. Their leader Muhamed Yusuf was captured and extra judicially killed by the police. The group was taken over by Abubakar Shekau and hundreds of sympathetic youths joined in as it became more dangerous. The terror group shifted its agenda towards Islamic religious extremism and has caused deaths of thousands of innocent people and abductions of civilian. The brutal security operations against civilians by the security forces in Nigeria contributed immensely to the birth of Boko Haram group. The study by Onuoha & Oyewole focused only on Northern Nigeria and also there is limited study on how security operations in Kenya could lead to sympathy to terror groups. Therefore, this study endeavored to fill this gap.

According to Hassan, (2012) the factors that drive the Kenyan youth to join violent extremism groups are the; biological and physiological needs, safety needs, love and belongingness, esteem needs, cognitive needs, aesthetic needs, self-actualization and transcendence needs. The groups mostly target vulnerable youths who come from poor families and are unemployed. They lure them into their ranks and ideologies with promises for better life through monetary gains and employment opportunities. If the basic needs are not fulfilled within the rational ways, then the vulnerable youth may easily be swayed into joining the violent extremist groups hence engaging in their activities and eventually commit acts of terror to others. The argument was further strengthened by Kenrick et al., (2010) who stated that each individual is unique; the motivation for self-actualization leads them in different directions. This study attempted to interlink the social factors with measures by the security agencies to come up with possible ways of addressing violent extremism.

C. SECURITY MEASURE TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

According to Wille (2017) several attacks by terrorists in Europe in the recent years have drawn attention of political leaders and the civil society on how violent extremism may be countered in Europe. Most of the perpetrators of those attacks were found out to be the local European citizens who were members of the very societies they attacked. This study intended to examine the aspects of violent extremism outside Europe. According Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly, & Jarvis, (2014) the United Kingdom's (UK) coalition Government's measure against violent extremism is based upon four 4 Ps strategies. The Ps stands for Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. The researcher dwelt on the Preventing 'P' which is aimed at physical prevention measures. The study found out that the 4 Ps made some contribution towards tranquility however they were discriminatory against British Muslims because they were constantly profiled and their right to privacy infringed. This bred distrust from the British Muslims on the authorities and sympathy to the violent extremists. This study intended to fill this gap by identifying the most effective measure that would at the same time maintain the trust of the people. El-Said (2012) posited that owing to dynamism in cultures, mores, traditions, history, and rules and regulations diverse locations there is no single measure that can deal with all cases of violent extremism, even within a single region, as each region is slightly different from each other. This study intended to examine the related factors in Mombasa County Kenya. According to Miyandazi, (2012) Kenya sent its military to Somalia in 2011 to pursue Al Shabaab terrorists after they made several incursions into Kenya and kidnapping several tourists along the Kenya-Somali border. To coerce Kenya to withdraw its military from Somalia the terrorists intensified attacks inside Kenya, causing loss of hundreds of lives and damage to property. The study only dwelt on reasons why Kenya sent its military to Somalia and its consequences however it did not explore effectiveness of the measure to send the military to Somalia. This study intended to fill this gap by examining the effectiveness of measures by a security agency against an expected outcome. According to Glazzard, Jespersion,

Maguire and Winterbotham (2018) governments across the world are increasingly looking for new measures to address the drivers of violent extremism rather than wait and deal with the downstream consequences. They further indicated that the issue opened up a new field of mitigation known as countering violent extremism (CVE) which has come into existence as a non-coercive, softer approach to countering violent extremism.

D. CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

According to McGaghie, Issenberg, Petrusa, & Scalse, (2010) training and equipping individuals with the necessary and relevant skills is aimed at ensuring that they work efficiently and effectively. In relation to study Bundotich (2013) posited that most security agencies in sub Saharan Africa are not adequately trained to deal with violent extremism problem within their territories. However, Bundotich's study did not specify which security agency and the type of training needs required. Different security agencies play varying roles in countering violent extremism and the training needs may not be same across the agencies. Therefore, this study intended to investigate any challenge associated with training in countering terrorism. Onuoha & Oyewole (2018) postulated that Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria has proved difficult for the Nigerian conventional army to defeat. This is owing to the fact that the terrorist keeps on shifting agendas, ideas, tactics, and leadership and operation bases from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad and beyond. They also received training and assistance from Al Shabaab in East Africa and from Al Qaida and Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa hence making it difficult to easily pursue across the borders. This study analyzed the social impact of security operations in counter violent extremism security operations.

E. APPROACHES TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM


According to Fink, (2014) United Nations Resolution 2178, 2014 emphasizes on the need for a comprehensive approach to curbing the spread of violent extremism. One aspect of such approach has come to be known as countering violent extremism (CVE). The resolution encourages Member States to engage with relevant local communities and Non-Governmental Organizations NGOs in adapting strategies to counter violent extremist narrative that can incite acts of terrorism. The member states are also called upon to address the causes of violent extremism. Fink only emphasized on social solution in the engagement of the communities and the NGOs with little on security measures. The study intended to evaluate the measures by law enforcement entities and link it to social the approaches of countering violent extremism. According to McQuaid, Asfura-Heim, Mak, & Powell, (2015) expanding counter violent extremism approaches beyond law enforcement interventions allows a broader operational space in the social domain with multiple actors and expertise. The role of local government is to solidify a collective vision and to assemble and enable a network of public sector and civil society stakeholders to lead culturally appropriate intervention services. The authors suggested the creation of

counter-narratives, rehabilitation of ex-terror operatives, and non-generalization of Muslims as terrorists by the media and sensitization of the public against violent extremism. The study was general and the suggestions may not be actionable in divergent circumstances and that is why this study intended to investigate on a specific location and circumstance. According to Boucek, (2008) Saudi Arabia developed a soft approach to countering violent extremism. The Saudi government instituted programs that integrate both civilians and former violent extremist combatants into post-conflict societies through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR) and rehabilitation programs. These strategies target those individuals, who were determined to be at risk segments to joining violent extremism groups and terror convicted who were in jail serving sentences. The study revealed that however the program realized 80 % success the remaining 20% the program subjects returned to the battlefield with more commitment to deadlier violence than before. The study did not evaluate why program did not succeed in stopping those who reverted back to violent extremism. This study intends to fill the gap by evaluating the measures in countering violent extremism that may cause recidivism to terror activities

F. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The acts of violent extremism are the dependent variable and security measures by the police as the independent variable. There was also the intervening variable which moderated the other two variables. This study intended to evaluate the measures the police in Mombasa take to address violent extremism against the expected outcomes.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. RESEARCH DESIGN

The main approach used was both qualitative and quantitative in nature. The reason for the use of this design is that the measures against violent extremism cannot be quantified therefore it was given Likert scale levels, designed from 1-5, the lowest (1) being the least effective and the highest (5) being the most effective (Fink, 2015). Another reason for the

design is that it was only going to narrate a phenomenon that already exists and not create any new ones. They responses were graded accordingly to establish the most effective measures against violent extremism. (Creswell,2013)

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

A. PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

This objective was aimed at evaluating the physical strategic actions that the police take in countering terrorism activities. The respondents were asked to indicate their level of concurrence with the hard measures which the police take to prevent terrorism and the result of their response is indicated in table 1 below.

Table 1: The Hard Actions

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Security screenings	47.8	40.4	9.6	1.5	0.7
Guarding of vital installations	40.4	44.9	11.0	2.2	1.5
Security patrols	40.4	51.5	5.9	2.2	0.0
Security road checks	44.9	39.7	6.6	8.1	0.7
Security swoops in dwelling areas	39.0	44.9	11.0	5.1	0.0
Total	212.5	221.4	41.1	21.3	2.9

According to Boucek, (2008) softer approaches yield more success than hard approaches. However, this study established the contrary where the respondents felt that hard approaches could also yield success within the location of the study. This measure may only be effective and minimally applied when an identified population intentionally conceal and assists the terrorists. Physical security measures may only serve as immediate strategy against terror activities. It's through this measure that dangerous weapons, suspicious movement, last stage attack execution planning and usage of false documents may be detected and pre-empted. However, this would prevent and deter immediate and imminent terror activities, it should be supplemented by long lasting non-physical and softer to counter approaches to violent extremism.

B. NON-PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The non-physical security measures refer to the soft approaches against violent extremism or terrorism activities. These measures include collection and sharing of intelligence on terrorism by the various security agencies, watching of terror suspects through covert surveillance, offering reward to the public for information leading to apprehension of those suspects and using counter narratives against radicalization. The respondents were asked to indicate their concurrence with the non-hard physical measures and the outcome is indicated in table 2 below.

Table 2: The Soft Approaches Against Violent Extremism

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Intelligence	66.2	30.1	2.9	0.0	0.7
Inter-agency exchange of information	58.1	35.3	5.9	0.7	0.0
Price tag wanted terror suspect	28.7	35.3	22.8	8.8	4.4
Surveillance on terror suspects	61.8	33.1	4.4	0.7	0.0
Sensitization of the public	52.9	31.6	8.1	4.4	2.9
Total	267.2	165.4	44.1	14.6	8.0

The results in table 6 shows the findings in percentage on the soft measures as expressed in the five statements. Intelligence information about terrorism is carefully gathered on specific targets. The information is processed, analyzed, refined then disseminated to the police for action. It is important in that it offers the action teams the real time information about specific terror suspect or violent extremism activities. With the information, the police may be able to carry out intelligence led operations against violent extremism. This may take a short time as the police can go directly to their identified target for action. It may also save resources in that operations may be optimized to a specific location. It may avoid constrained police – public relationships that might be caused by indiscriminate security swoops which could probably victimize both suspects and victims alike.

C. POLICE MEASURES AGAINST INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM SUSPECTS

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with statements relating to the manner in which the police handle terror suspects within their custody. The individual terror suspects are those who are arrested or summoned by the police to be investigated for engagement in violent extremism activities. Five statements were used to rate the opinion of the respondents regarding the question and the results is as presented in table 3 below.

Table 3: Counter Measures against Individual Suspects

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Proactive arrests	47.1	44.1	7.4	1.5	0.0
Interrogations/interviews of terror suspects	28.7	52.9	12.5	4.4	1.5
Prosecution of terror suspects	42.6	40.4	11.0	4.4	1.5
Detaining of terror suspects	41.2	38.2	10.3	8.1	2.2
Compelling attendance to police station	18.4	32.4	17.6	23.5	8.1
Total	178	208	58.8	41.9	13.3

The respondents agreed that targeted action on specific terrorist was better as it avoided generalization that could also net an innocent individual

D. DRIVERS TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

It was also important to ascertain the factors that made individuals engage in violent extremism activities. Therefore, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent in which given social factors drive the subjects into violent extremism. This objective was evaluated through seven statements and the results shown in table 4 below.

Table 4: Causes of Terrorism Activities

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Poverty	26.5	33.1	22.8	10.3	7.4
Offers for employment	33.1	47.1	7.4	8.8	3.7
Radicalization by radical clerics	55.9	30.9	8.1	2.9	2.2
Marginalization	21.3	33.1	19.1	14.7	11.8
Encouragement by family/ community members	16.2	31.6	15.4	25.0	11.8
Extreme religious beliefs	42.6	33.8	11.8	8.1	3.7
Lack of formal education	25.0	29.4	19.9	18.4	7.4
Total	220.6	239	104.5	88.2	45.8

E. INTERVENING MEASURES AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

To find a possible solution to the violent extremism activities it was important to identify and evaluate the possible counter measures. Therefore, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with specific interventions the police may adopt in addressing violent extremism. The interventions were expressed in five statements and the results shown in table 5 below.

Table 5: The Intervening Actions

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Rehabilitation and reintegration of extremists	44.9	39.7	9.6	3.7	2.2
Engagement of local communities	45.6	41.2	11.0	1.5	0.7
Counter radicalization narrative programs	41.9	45.6	9.6	2.9	0.0
Formal Education to communities in affected zones	33.8	52.2	11.8	2.2	0.0
Amnesty offers to terror suspects	27.2	25.0	20.6	9.6	17.6
Total	193.4	203.7	62.6	19.9	20.5

Rehabilitation and re-integration solely apply to those terror suspects or returnees who have volunteered to leave the terrorist groups and seek normal life once more. They are booked in reforms institutions, where they are taken through deradicalization programs and assisted to fit back into the society. They are empowered with skills and resources to enable them engage in life sustaining activities. This counter measure works well with those operatives who were lured into terrorism as a result of poverty or lack of employment. Leaving the returnees without empowering and engaging them in some normal social activities may render them idle, hence vulnerable to relapsing back into violent extremism. However, a minority of the respondent were of the opinion that engaging ex terrorist may not prevent them from going back to violent extremism; majority affirmed it as an effective measure. Another identified intervention was engagement of the local communities to partner with the police against

terrorism. Terror suspects carry out their clandestine activities within the members of the public, who may have knowledge on those activities and possible solutions. To this end the respondents confirmed that it is important for the police to work closely with the members of the local communities in the fight against violent extremism. Radicalizers begin the recruitment process by imparting extremist ideologies in the minds of their subjects hence to defeat violent extremism there is need to target the mind for counter ideologies. The response greatly deduced that authorities should consider having clear policy on counter narrative as one of the solutions to violent extremism. As found in a previous question lack of formal education is not exclusively a driver to violent extremism, the overall response to these questions also show that having formal education is only a part, but not complete solution to violent extremism. Offering amnesty to terror suspects to surrender themselves to the police in exchange for leniency against their activities was also considered as a possible intervening measure. This may only be a stop gap measure since not all terror suspects may give in to the authorities. The statistics show that only about half of the respondents approved and the other half failed approve that terror suspects should be offered amnesty. Therefore, amnesty is not a long-lasting solution but an approach just to interdict violent extremism.

F. CHALLENGES AGAINST COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM EFFORTS

This objective was significant for policy formulation as it is important to establish any challenges and extent the police face same as they fight terrorism. To establish the possible answers to this objective the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which specific deficiencies were impediment to counter violent extremism efforts and the results are presented in table 6 below.

Table 6: Challenges Against Counter Violent Extremism Efforts

	Strongly Agree	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Inadequate resources	64.0	25.7	8.8	0.7	0.7
Insufficient legislation	33.1	42.6	10.3	11.0	2.9
Lack of relevant training for police officers	44.9	27.2	17.6	7.4	2.9
Poor police-community relations	35.3	35.3	22.1	5.9	1.5
Clandestine operations of violent extremist groups	28.7	42.6	20.6	3.7	4.4
Lack of intelligence	33.1	35.3	22.1	8.1	1.5
Total	239.1	208.7	101.5	36.8	13.9

Resources are the enablers that the police ought to be provided with to effectively fight violent extremism. They may include vehicles, Information Technology and Communication equipment and money to pay for intelligence information. It's important to note that other counter measures such as engagement of the local communities and use of intelligence may also be useful to the police to realize an effective counter violent extremism measure. The laws available may not be explicit to handle violent extremism. Apart from enforcement of counter terrorism laws, the role of the police is not well defined in other counter measures such as engagement of the local communities and deradicalization and rehabilitation programs. According to the respondents,

despite interacting extensively with terror suspects, the police roles do not include any level of engagement in offering of counter narratives, rehabilitation and deradicalization programs to terror suspects. This role is mainly done only by non-governmental organizations and religious organizations. Therefore, the authorities should consider enacting laws that may enable them have a role in engagement of the local communities. Other laws are also not stringent enough to the deter acts of violent extremism. To this end the respondents overwhelmingly approved insufficient laws to be a challenge in countering violent extremism. Lack of training of police officers in tackling terrorism is a serious challenge. Terrorism is an emerging global security challenge and terrorists continue to invent new ways of committing acts of terrorism. To counter them, the police need to be engaged in continuous training to gain new counter skills. Poor police-public relations may yield to negative engagement or no engagement at all. Members of the public may know but fail to inform the police of terror suspects amongst them. In positive relations the members of the public are likely to offer the police information about terrorism activities.

V. SUMMARY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. FINDINGS

The drivers to violent extremism were found to be linked to social factors such as poverty, lack of employment, radicalization by radical clerics, marginalization in terms of social development, lack of formal education, self-radicalization through jihadist websites and social media Hardening of vulnerable target is an important measure against violent extremism and terrorist attacks. Intelligence led policing, inter-agency exchange of information, also immensely contributes to effective counter measures.

B. CONCLUSION

The study examined the effectiveness of police measures in addressing violent extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya. It was established that police measures had both direct and indirect impact on the levels of violent extremism. The respondents were of the opinion that certain police actions such as general swoops on targeted communities had adverse effect on prevalence of violent extremism instead of reducing it. It created mistrust between the members of those communities and the security agencies. Some community members went as far as even sympathizing with those terrorists as a direct result of police action. It was particularly noted in the physical hard measures and the need to use softer community approach such as liaising with the members of the community was seen to have greater advantage in mitigating acts associated with violent extremism. These softer approaches were seen as the use of intelligence to deal with terrorism was a greatly preferred approach. The causes of violent extremism were found to be in push and pull factors such as social economic conditions such as poverty, lack of formal education and radicalization and encouragement by radical clerics. The individuals who engaged in terror activities were driven by searching for ways to sustain their livelihoods. Others were convinced to join those groups due to extreme ideology and not for material gains. The approaches to improve measures used by the police to address

violent extremism in Mombasa County were established as the factors moderating violent extremism activities. These include counter narratives by moderate clerics and reintegration and rehabilitation of surrendered terror operatives, the need of Police-public partnership. (Figure 1: Conceptual Framework). There was also the need for authorities ensuring that the youth receive basic education and announce offers of amnesty for any radical individuals who gave in to the authority.

The challenges the police face was found to hinder the countering violent extremism efforts by those law enforcers. Inadequate resources, lack of relevant training to the police and poor police – public relationships were the most predominant challenges in the police measures against terrorism.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Grounded on findings of the study were various recommendations aimed at improving police measures against violent extremism. The study endorses the application of intelligence led policing approaches to pin point the terror operatives hence avoid the general inconvenience of through indiscriminate security swoop that apart from going for terror suspects, might also net innocent individuals.

The study also recommends the hardening of soft targets such as crowded public places through security guard frisks, walk through security scanners, surveillance cameras and improved access controls. This will help in making it harder for terrorists to carry out pre-attack surveys and in the end the prevention of terrorism.

The police and members of the public should partner more in controlling violent extremism. This can be done by the creation of forums where both will specifically focus on violent extremism to find solutions to the problem. This will help the police in getting intelligence reports from those members of the communities on issues of concern to terrorism they experience within their areas. The major stakeholders including and not limited to County governments, community leaders, interior ministry in charge of security, Ministry of Finance, the Kenya National Police Service and the National Counter Terrorism Centre to work together build police capacity to manage violent extremism. This can be through more funding and training of police officers in Counter Violent extremism.

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